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Abstract 
 
Analysis of an original nationwide Internet survey reveals that health-related behavior shows associations 
with three aspects of time discounting: (i) impatience, measured by the overall discount rate; (ii) present 
bias, measured by the degree of declining impatience in the generalized hyperbolic discount function; and 
(iii) the sign effect, in that future losses are discounted at a lower rate than future gains. Present-biased 
respondents are classified as naïve if the responses are indicative of being a time-inconsistent 
procrastinator, and classified as sophisticated otherwise. The health-related indicators that we examine 
relate to smoking, health condition, dentition status, and body habitus. We first show that a higher degree 
of impatience tends to worsen health-related attributes. Second, respondents with more steeply declining 
impatience tend to develop more unhealthy behavior and ill-health conditions, and the tendencies are likely 
to be stronger for naïfs than for sophisticates. Third, the sign effect, too, shows an association with 
health-related behavior, although the significance levels are not overly high. Consistent with these findings, 
the principal component of the health-related measures shows strong associations with the degrees of 
impatience and declining impatience. 
 
Keywords: health, time preference, discount rate, hyperbolic discounting, the sign effect, the 
probit model 
JEL classification: I1, D03, D90 
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1. Introduction 
 
This study focuses on the associations of health-related behavior with three aspects of time discounting: 
(i) impatience, (ii) hyperbolic discounting or declining impatience, and (iii) the sign effect. To do so, we 
conduct an original nationwide Internet survey of Japanese adults that includes questions that help us 
measure respondents’ behavioral inclinations with respect to time discounting. 
Since Grossman (1972) proposes a health investment model, health-related choices are considered 
intertemporal decision making, such that, for example, consumers allocate their resources to maximize 
their discounted utility under trade-offs between a small and immediate reward (e.g., eating high-calorie 
meals) and a larger delayed reward (e.g., enjoying future good health), or between an immediate payment 
(e.g., exercise or routine medical checkups) and a larger delayed payment (e.g., suffering from 
lifestyle-related diseases such as obesity and diabetes). Therefore, the degree of impatience is predicted to 
correlate with current health-related behavior—such as caloric intake, dental care, and smoking—as well 
as resulting health statuses, such as BMI, dentition status, and subjective health condition.1 
Behavioral economics, in the meanwhile, finds two behavioral properties in people’s time discounting: 
hyperbolic discounting, where a person applies a higher discount rate in immediate future choices than in 
distant future choices, and the sign effect, where a person discounts positive pay-offs more intensely than 
negative pay-offs (e.g., Thaler, 1981; Benzion et al., 1989; Chapman, 1996). Hyperbolic discounters would 
sacrifice their future health for small immediate pleasures (e.g., Ainslie, 1992; Gruber and Kőszegi, 2001; 
Chabris et al., 2008; Ikeda et al., 2010; Kang and Ikeda, 2010). People with the sign effect, in contrast, 
would be strongly reluctant to bear the future cost of lost health for immediate gratification (Odum et al., 
2002; Ikeda et al., 2010; Kang and Ikeda, 2010). Despite the fact that logical and testable predictions of 
health-related behavior are developed, there are few attempts at direct and systematic empirical 
confirmation. 
We test the associations between time preferences and health-related behavior by eliciting three 
measures for time-discounting properties (i.e., impatience, declining impatience, and the sign effect) from 
                                                  
1
 The study of Fuchs (1980) is the first to detect relationships between individual impatience and 
health-related behavior. For brief surveys, see Chapman (2003) and Cawley and Ruhm (2011). 
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four hypothetical questions regarding intertemporal choices. Hyperbolic discounters are sorted into 
sophisticates and naïfs by posing questions about planning and doing homework assignments in childhood. 
As a result, we show that time-preference measures widely relate to health-related decisions and current 
health statuses, such as smoking, being obese or underweight, subjective health status, and dentition status. 
The contributions of this study are threefold. First, we specify the discount factor in the form of a 
“generalized hyperbolic discount function” (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992), which is characterized by two 
parameters: the degree of hyperbolic deviation from exponential discounting (α) and the determinant of the 
intercept (η). We adduce the two parameters for each individual from responses to hypothetical questions 
regarding immediate future choices and distant future choices. Each individual’s α measures his or her 
degree of declining impatience. We find that this measure is associated with health-related behavior in the 
manner predicted. The individual’s degree of impatience is constructed by combining the inferred 
individual values of parameter η with other discount rates.  
Second, by jointly incorporating the three time-discounting variables as regressors, this research 
detects partial associations between each time-discounting property and health-related behavior. In this 
sense, the current study sharply contrasts with previous empirical studies, which merely focus on either 
aspect of the time-discounting properties.2 This difference is important, because the three time-discounting 
properties are not mutually exclusive (e.g., hyperbolic discounters can be less patient in terms of the 
overall discount rate and may or may not show a gain–loss asymmetry in discounting).3 Our set of 
inquires enables us to focus simultaneously on the multifaceted nature of time discounting.4 
                                                  
2
 The study of Grignon (2009) is a typical example: to compare smoking decisions among the types of 
time discounting, it classifies respondents into impatient, patient, and present-biased agents. Chabris et al. 
(2008) focus on the association between the degree of declining impatience and health behavior, without 
incorporating the other time-discounting properties. 
3
 In our dataset, 28.3% of respondents (N = 543) display below-average discount rates, while showing 
both the hyperbolic property and the incidence of the sign effect. 
4
 Based on a similar motivation, we also detect partial associations of the three time-discounting properties 
with body mass index—defined as weight in kilograms divided by height in meters squared (kg/m2), 
debt-holding behavior, and cigarette consumption. See Ikeda et al. (2010), Ikeda and Kang (2011), and 
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Third, our study partially succeeds in detecting the inclinations of naïve hyperbolic discounters toward 
worse health statuses. Economic theory has shown that in many cases, time-inconsistent over-consumption 
behavior due to hyperbolic discounting is more salient for naïfs, who misperceive their self-control 
problem, than for sophisticates, who incorporate the effect of the problem into their decision making. In 
the context of health decisions, it is predicted that naïve hyperbolic discounters have greater inclinations 
toward ill health statuses than sophisticated hyperbolic discounters and exponential discounters. 5 
Irrespective of the predictions, there have been few attempts to test their empirical validity. By sorting 
hyperbolic respondents into naïfs and sophisticates, the current study fills this research gap. 
The present research generates the following three findings. First, a higher degree of impatience 
worsens health-related attributes; second, steeply declining impatience or a present-biased preference leads 
respondents to more unhealthy behavior, or to ill-health conditions, and such behavioral impacts are 
stronger for naïfs than for sophisticates; and third, the sign effect shows associations with health-related 
attributes, consistent with our prediction, although the levels of statistical significance are weak.  
The remainder of this paper is constructed as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the theoretical 
relationship between time discounting and health-related behavior, and explains the data. Section 3 shows 
the empirical results. Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Data and hypotheses 
 
Our research detects the empirical associations between health-related behavior and three aspects of time 
discounting: (i) hyperbolic discounting, (ii) impatience, and (iii) the sign effect. To do so, the original 
nationwide Internet survey “Japan Internet Survey on Preferences Relating to Time and Risk” (hereafter, 
JPTR) is used. The JPTR was conducted from October 21 to 27, 2010, through Nikkei Research, Inc., a 
                                                                                                                                                          
Kang and Ikeda (2010). 
5
 Indeed, in the context of the smoking decision, Gruber and Kőszegi (2004) theoretically show that naïve 
hyperbolic discounters have a higher smoking propensity than sophisticated hyperbolic discounters and the 
exponential discounters, whereas the difference in smoking propensity between sophisticated hyperbolic 
discounters and exponential discounters is not overly large. 
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representative private research company that handles economic surveys. The respondents are 2,386 
Japanese adults aged 20–65 years, selected by stratified random sampling from the Nikkei Research 
Access Pane that comprises a total of about 155,000 individuals, such that the age–gender distribution is as 
close as possible to that of the Japanese census.6 As incentives, cash vouchers are provided to respondents 
by lottery. 
Various questions are contained in the JPTR to elicit time and risk preferences, health-related behavior, 
health conditions, and respondents’ economic, demographic, and social attributes such as income, asset 
holdings, gender, university degree, and age. Panel A of Table 1 shows the summary statistics of 
background attributes of the respondents: males comprise 49.9% of all respondents, and the average age 
overall is 41.8 years.7 
 
Insert Table 1 
 
2.1. Health-related variables 
 
Several health-related questions asked in the JPTR are listed in Table 2. We construct six indicator 
variables from these questions for the explained variables. 
 
Insert Table 2 
 
A smoking indicator, SMOKING, is created from FQ1, such that it equals 1 if respondents report the 
consumption of more than 10 cigarettes per day, and 0 otherwise.8 From responses to questions about the 
                                                  
6
 During the survey period, 11,090 registrants were notified about the survey by e-mail. 
7
 To elicit the degree of risk aversion, we asked respondents to make three sequential binary choices, as in 
Figure 1 for discount rates, on whether they play lottery “A” that pays out JPY100,000 (USD1,233) with 
probability 0.5 at given prices, specified as JPY10 to JPY50,000. 
8
 In all, 500 respondents who chose option (vii) in FQ1 (i.e., have quit smoking) are excluded from our 
analysis.  
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respondents’ height and weight in FQ2, we calculate BMI values and identify obese and underweight 
adults by creating three binary indicators: OBESITY, which takes the value of 1 if BMI ≥ 25, and 0 
otherwise; SEVERE OBESITY, which takes the value of 1 if BMI ≥ 30, and 0 otherwise; and 
UNDERWEIGHT, which takes the value of 1 if BMI < 18.5, and 0 otherwise.9 As an indicator of 
subjective health status, HEALTH is created from FQ3, which takes the value of 1 if a respondent selects a 
value equal to or greater than six, and 0 otherwise. Finally, a binary indicator, HEALTHYTEETH, takes 
the value of 1 if a respondent has such good dentition that he or she has kept all permanent teeth (i.e., 
people select option (i) in FQ4), and 0 otherwise.  
Panel B of Table 1 shows the summary statistics of health-related indicators: smokers account for 
17.2% of all respondents; obese people, very obese people, and underweight people comprise 18.1%, 3.1%, 
and 11.5% of the respondents, respectively; 72.6% of the respondents rate their own health status as being 
six points or higher on a 10-point scale, from 1 to 10; and respondents with a healthy dentition status 
comprise 65.2% of the total. 
 
2.2. Time preferences 
 
In the JPTR, four questions on intertemporal choices were asked to determine the nature of the 
respondents’ time discounting: two (Q1 and Q2) were designed to detect the degree of declining 
impatience; the other two (Q5 and Q6) were asked to detect the incidence of the sign effect. The degree of 
impatience is measured by combining the four questions. Respondents are classified as sophisticates or 
naïfs, based on the degree of difference between their planned and actual behavior with respect to their 
imposed tasks. 
 
2.2.1. Hyperbolic discounting (declining impatience) 
 
Consider that the consumers’ discount factor for future felicity with delay τ is given by the generalized 
                                                  
9
 Such criteria regarding bodily habitus are provided by the Examination Committee of Criteria for 
“Obesity Disease in Japan,” which is affiliated with the Japan Society for the Study of Obesity (JSSO). 
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hyperbolic discount function ƒ(τ): 
0,0,0,)1(),;( ≥≥≥+= − ηατατηατ ηf .                       (1) 
According to the definition of the discount rate ρ that equals –ƒ'(τ) / ƒ (τ), it can be calculated as follows: 
ατ
αηηατρ
+
=
1
),;( .                                  (2) 
In equation (2), the discount rate is declining in delay τ, which represents the usual property of 
hyperbolic discounters: such individuals are less patient in immediate future choices than in distant future 
choices (e.g., Ainslie, 2001; Benzion et al., 1989). Here, the parameter α indicates the degree of declining 
impatience: as α increases, the degree of declining impatience is higher. Especially, the relative discount 
rates ρ(τ1) / ρ(τ2) (=(1 + ατ2) / (1 + ατ1)) for two distinct delays τ1 and τ2 (τ1 > τ2), which are smaller than 1, 
depend solely on α (i.e., a larger α implies a smaller ρ(τ1) / ρ(τ2)), with it leading to a stronger 
present-biased preference. 
To elicit the degree of declining impatience α, we use the two JPTR questions Q1 and Q2, which 
sequentially propose three queries of binary choices on immediate future and distant future trade-offs, 
respectively. Figure 1 shows tree diagrams that illustrate the sequential queries. 
 
Insert Figure 1 
 
In Q1, respondents are asked to choose between (A) receiving JPY1,000 (around USD12.33) today, 
and (B) receiving JPY1,000 plus a certain additional amount one week later. In Q2, on the other hand, the 
options are (A) receiving JPY1,000 one year later, and (B) receiving JPY1,000 plus a certain additional 
amount one year and one week later. Let XQ1 and XQ2 be the delayed monetary amounts in Q1 and Q2, 
respectively, which are taken as subjectively equivalent to JPY1,000 in options (A). Then, the degree of 
declining impatience α in equation (1) is obtained by solving jointly 
 
1,000 = XQ1 ƒ(7, α, η), 
1,000 ƒ(365, α, η) = XQ2 ƒ(372, α, η), 
 
which are combined into a nonlinear equation of α, 
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The sample mean of estimated α takes the value of 0.018, which differs significantly from 0 (p < 0.00). As 
a positive α implies declining impatience or present-biased preferences, it is determined that an average 
respondent in our sample is present-biased. Respondents with present-biased preferences (i.e., with a 
positive α) comprise 40.2% (N = 960) of the 2,386 respondents. 
 
Naïfs and sophisticates 
 
We place hyperbolic discounters into two categories, in terms of their self-awareness of the 
time-inconsistent property inherent in their behavior: sophisticated hyperbolic discounters, who are aware 
of their own time inconsistency which is wrought by hyperbolic discounting, and naïve hyperbolic 
discounters, who misconceive themselves as being time-consistent. Economic theory has shown that in 
many cases, time-inconsistent over-consumption behavior due to hyperbolic discounting is more salient for 
naïfs than for sophisticates. Sophisticates behave time-consistently by incorporating the effect of a 
preference reversal in time discounting, whereas naïfs do not take their self-control problem into account, 
and hence, they are likely to consume excessively in a time-inconsistent way.10 We hypothesize that 
hyperbolic discounters are more likely to show inclinations toward ill health than exponential discounters, 
and that the tendency is stronger for naïve hyperbolic discounters than for sophisticated hyperbolic 
discounters. 
To classify each of the hyperbolic respondents as being naïfs or sophisticates, we pose two questions as 
to (i) how respondents used to do homework assignments during their childhood vacations, and (ii) how 
they had planned to do them:  
                                                  
10
 Behavioral differences between naïfs and sophisticates are discussed in terms of procrastination 
behavior, by O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999); borrowing behavior, by Heidhue and Kőszegi (2010) and 
Ikeda and Kang (2011); and smoking behavior, by Gruber and Kőszegi (2004) and Kang and Ikeda (2010). 
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Q3. Reflecting back on when you were a child and you were given an assignment to be completed 
during the school vacation, how early did you usually finish the assignment? (Mark the appropriate 
box with an “X.”) 
(i) Did it right away 
(ii) Tended to get it done early, before the due date 
(iii) Worked on it daily up until the due date 
(iv) Tended to get it done toward the end 
(v) Got it done at the last minute 
 
Q4. Reflecting back on when you were a child and you were given an assignment to be completed 
during school vacation, how early did you plan to finish the assignment? (Mark the appropriate box 
with an “X.”) 
(i) I planned to get it done right away 
(ii) I planned to get it done rather early, before the due date 
(iii) I planned to work on it daily up until the due date 
(iv) I planned to get it done closer toward the end 
(v) I planned to get it done at the last minute 
(vi) I didn’t make any plans 
 
After excluding 109 hyperbolic respondents who chose option (vi) in Q4 (i.e., who had not made any 
plans), we identify present-biased respondents (that is, those with α > 0) who chose a larger number in Q3 
than in Q4 as being naïfs, because they tended to procrastinate on jobs in a time-inconsistent manner. The 
nonhyperbolic respondents (α ≤ 0) or respondents who choose a weakly smaller number in Q3 than Q4 are 
identified as being sophisticates. The naïfs account for 60.0% (N = 576) of 960 hyperbolic respondents 
who used to fail their own plans for doing assignments. 
 
2.2.2. The sign effect 
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Many behavioral economists have reported that discount rates for losses are lower than those for gains 
(e.g., Thaler, 1981; Loewenstein, 1988; Fredrick et al., 2002; Benzion et al., 1989; Chapman, 1996). This 
sign effect prompts people to prefer to incur losses immediately rather than delay them, and to have a 
strong desire to avoid future losses by bearing costs in the present. Indeed, the incidence of the sign effect 
leads people to consider seriously the future psychological and monetary losses of borrowing, addiction, 
and ill health.11 We thus hypothesize that a person who exhibits the sign effect is more likely to avoid 
unhealthy behavior and likely to maintain a healthy status, compared to those who do not exhibit it. 
To detect the sign effect, two discount rates for payments and receipts are elicited from the JPTR. 
Table 3 shows the pay-off tables used to elicit discount rates, arranged in terms of the literature (e.g., 
Harrison et al., 2002). Each table consists of nine intertemporal trade-offs, where the monetary amounts 
with a front-end delay are commonly set at JPY1 million (around USD12,330.76). From the series of 
options chosen by respondents, which are expected to change from “A” to “B” in Q5 (from “B” to “A” in 
Q6), the individual discount rate ρ (Q5) (ρ (Q6)) can be estimated as the median interest rates of 
indifference categories, in which selected options change from “A” to “B” in Q5 (from “B” to “A” in Q6). 
The sample mean of ρ (Q5) is 8.8%, whereas that of ρ (Q6) is 1.0%. Since the difference of the two 
means is highly significant (p < 0.000), the average respondent displays the sign effect. Respondents 
exhibiting the sign effect (N = 1,859) comprise 81.1% of the total. We construct a binary indicator for the 
sign effect: 


 −+−≥−
=
otherwise0
(Q6)](Q5)σ[(Q6)](Q5)E[(Q6)(Q5)if1
effectSign 
ρρρρρ ρ
, 
where E(•) and σ(•) represent sample means and standard deviations, respectively.12 
 
                                                  
11
 The predicted relationships between the incidence of the sign effect and actual behavior such as 
borrowing, cigarette consumption, and BMI are detected in the studies of Ikeda and Kang (2011), Ikeda et 
al. (2010), and Kang and Ikeda (2010), respectively. 
12
 We also define an indicator variable for the sign effect, which takes the value of 1 if ρ (Q5) is greater 
than ρ (Q6), and 0 otherwise. However, the detected associations between the indicator and health-related 
attributes are found in our estimations to be insignificant. 
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Insert Table 3 
 
2.2.4. Impatience 
 
In equation (2), the discount rate equals αη when τ = 0, which implies that, for any given α, η determines 
the discount rate for an infinitesimally short horizon. For given α and τ, therefore, the discount rate ρ has 
the same information as η. To ease interpretation, and considering the data availability, we focus on (α, ρ), 
instead of (α, η), as determinants of health behavior. The discount factor depends negatively on both 
declining impatience α and impatience ρ.13 
To measure the respondents’ degree of impatience ρ, we take the standardized average of the four 
discount rates: Two are discount rates for τ = 7 and 372, elicited from Q1 and Q2, respectively—that is, 
they are calculated from equation (2); the other two are the discount rates for future receipts and payments, 
implied by Q5 and Q6.14 
 
3. Results 
 
3.1. Means in stratified sample 
 
In the first step of our analysis, we examine simple associations between time discounting and 
health-related attributes. Table 4 compares the average values of health-related indicators among 
respondents stratified by whether their impatience is declining (α > 0) or not (α ≤ 0); whether impatience ρ 
is higher than the average or not; and whether the sign effect is present (θ = 1) or not (θ = 0). The table 
shows that health-related attributes relate to the degree of declining impatience and the degree of 
                                                  
13
 When we rewrite ƒ(τ; α, η) as F(τ, α, ρ(τ; α, η)), the discount factor F satisfies ∂F(τ, α, ρ) / ∂τ = ƒτ < 0,  
∂F(τ, α, ρ) / ∂α = ƒα < 0, and ∂F(τ, α, ρ) / ∂ρ = ((1 + ατ) / α)ƒη < 0. 
14
 Note that daily discount rates are imputed from Q1 and Q2, whereas ρ (Q5) and ρ (Q6) are expressed in 
annual rates. This difference does not matter, since the average of the four discount rates is calculated from 
their standardized values. 
12 
 
impatience, as we hypothesize. First, nonhyperbolic discounters (α ≤ 0) are more likely to develop healthy 
behavior and a good health condition than hyperbolic discounters (α > 0). For example, respondents who 
maintain healthy teeth comprise 71.3% of nonhyperbolic discounters—a percentage higher than the 
corresponding percentages in the samples of naïve hyperbolic discounters (56.1%) and sophisticated 
hyperbolic discounters (60.4%).15 Second, naïfs with a positive α value are more likely to develop 
unhealthy behavior and an ill-health condition than sophisticated hyperbolic respondents and 
nonhyperbolic respondents. For example, the smoking rate in the sample of naïfs is 22.5%, which is higher 
than the 16.4% figure for the sample of sophisticates and 14.7% for the nonhyperbolic. Third, in all cases, 
impatient respondents (ρ > mean) display stronger inclinations toward ill health than patient ones; the 
differences are all significant and with predicted signs. In contrast, associations with the sign effect are 
insignificant and unstable, where the observed signs are, in many cases, the opposite of those predicted. 
 
Insert Table 4 
 
3.2. Regression results 
 
To detect associations of time discounting with health-related attributes, we estimate the following probit 
models: 



+++++Φ
++++Φ
=
=
)*(
)(
),,,|1Pr(
iiiNiiNi
iiii
iiiii
xDc
xc
xY
γθβρβαβαβ
γθβρβαβ
θρα
θρα
θρα  
where, for the dependent variable iY , various health-related indicators, as defined in Section 2.1, are 
adopted; Φ represents the cumulative normal distribution; and (αί, ρί, θί) indicate time-discounting 
attributes: degree of declining impatience, impatience, and the incidence of the sign effect, respectively. In 
model (B), by adding the interaction term of declining impatience with a naïve indicator, αί*DNi, a 
coefficient βα captures the partial correlation of present-biased preferences for the sophisticates on the 
                                                  
15
 Note that the unreported difference of average values of HEALTH between hyperbolic discounters and 
nonhyperbolic discounters is significant and with the expected sign, although the difference between the 
naïve hyperbolic discounters and the sophisticated ones is found to be insignificant. 
for model (A), 
 
for model (B), 
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latent variable of Yi, and the corresponding partial correlation for the naïfs is obtained by βα + βN. The 
control variables xi contain the following personal attributes: (i) the degree of risk aversion; (ii) 
demographic factors including age, gender, and college graduation; and (iii) economic factors including 
household income, household real asset holdings, and household financial asset holdings. 
Table 5 summarizes the marginal effects of declining impatience (α), impatience (ρ), and the sign effect 
(θ) on the probabilities that health-related indicators will take the value of 1. Corresponding robust 
standard errors are given in parentheses.  
As we shall explain, our hypotheses are supported in the case of impatience and declining impatience. 
First, health-related attributes have significant associations with the degree of impatience, with the 
predicted signs. In particular, smoking and teeth condition for males and health condition for females show 
strongly significant associations with the degree of impatience: all other personal attributes being equal, a 
1 increase in impatience from the average induces a 7.9–9.9 percentage-point increase in the probability 
of being a smoker and a 6.3–12.3 percentage-point increase in the probability of having unhealthy teeth, 
for males; similarly, a 1 increase in impatience induces a 4.9–6.4 percentage-point increase in the 
probability of developing ill-health condition, for females. 
Second, health-related attributes also show significant associations with the degree of declining 
impatience: when the degree of declining impatience α is larger, the probabilities of males being smokers 
and being obese and those of females being severely obese and developing ill conditions for both health 
and teeth are higher. Importantly, health-related attributes associate significantly with the interaction terms 
of the declining impatience with the naivety indicator, whereas the associations with the interaction terms 
with the sophistication indicator are insignificant in almost all the cases. This implies that naivety is likely 
to lead respondents with steeply declining impatience toward more unhealthy behavior, whereas 
sophistication attenuates such time-inconsistent behavior. Quantitatively, for example, an increase in α by 
one unit of the sample standard deviation in the naïve sample leads to a 4.4 percentage-point 
(=0.066*0.672) higher probability of males being obese and a 0.7 percentage-point (=0.051*0.137) higher 
probability of females being severely obese.16 
Third, the sign effect shows the predicted signs; however, the significance levels are low. 
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 Among the naïfs, the value of the standard deviation of α is 0.066 for males and 0.051 for females. 
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Insert Tables 5 (a), (b), and (c) 
 
The principal component measure of health-related attributes 
 
To extract the inclination toward healthy behavior, a principal component variable HEALTHRELATED 
is created from the binary indicator OBESITY and three ordered variables that take the option number of 
responses to health-related questions regarding smoking (FQ1), health status (FQ3), and teeth condition 
(FQ4).17 The ordinary least squares estimation results using HEALTHRELATED for a regressand are 
summarized in Table 6: consistent with our expectations, the degree of impatience and the degree of 
declining impatience each displays strongly significant associations with the health-related principal 
component measure; also, the sign effect also shows the predicted signs, even though the detected impacts 
are insignificant.18 
 
Insert Table 6 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
                                                  
17
 To capture consistently tendencies toward healthy statuses, the binary indicator OBESITY and the 
six-scale ordered variable for smoking (Q1) are re-constructed such that their larger values imply healthier 
statuses. 
18
 Although the estimation of the generalized hyperbolic discounting function enables us to detect the 
marginal effect of a parametric increase in the degree of declining impatience on health-related behavior, 
the results may depend on the specification of the discounting function. To focus on the impact of the 
incidence of present-bias properties without depending on the specification of functional form, instead of 
αί, we use as a regressor the present-biased binary indicator, which takes the value of 1 if the respondent is 
present-biased (αί > 0), and 0 otherwise. See Appendices (a), (b), (c), and (d) for the estimation results, 
which indicate that the same detected relationships in Section 3 hold in the case of the present-bias 
indicator. 
15 
 
Based on analyses of data from an original Internet survey, we have shown that personal health-related 
attributes have expected correlations with time-discounting properties, including impatience, the present 
bias, and the sign effect: impatient respondents are more likely to have inclinations toward unhealthy 
behavior; respondents with more steeply declining impatience tend to develop more unhealthy behavior, 
where the tendencies are stronger for naïfs than for sophisticates; and the sign effect shows associations 
with health-related attributes, although the significance levels are not overly high. 
Our research is novel in three respects. First, the parameterized time-discounting properties induced by 
the generalized hyperbolic discounting function enable us to detect the empirical associations between the 
degree of declining impatience and health-related behavior. Second, hyperbolic discounters are classified 
into naïfs and sophisticates, based on the self-reported gap between planning and actual behavior for an 
onerous assignment. Third, partial associations between health-related attributes and each of the three 
time-discounting properties are detected. 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics
Panel A. Background attributes Mean (S.D.)
Age 41.763 (12.46) 
Male 0.499 (0.50) 
University grad. 0.546 (0.50) 
Risk aversion 0.623 (0.31) 
Household income (in JPY million) 6.90 (4.09) 
Household's financial assets (in JPY million) 14.53 (23.67) 
Household's real assets (in JPY million) 21.15 (29.54) 
Panel B. Health-related attributes
SMOKING 0.172 (0.38) 
HEALTH 0.726 (0.45) 
TEETH 0.652 (0.48) 
OBESITY 0.181 (0.38) 
SEVERE OBESITY 0.031 (0.17) 
UNDERWEIGHT 0.115 (0.32) 
2345
2351
1886
2386
2386
2351
Note : Data source: The original internet survey, The Japan Internet
Survey on Preferences Relating To Time and Risk (JPTR).
N
2386
2386
2386
2361
2386
2351
2351
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Table 2: Questions regarding health-related attributes 
 
FQ1. How many cigarettes do you smoke regularly? Select a proximal option from the following: 
(i) Never smoke 
(ii) Hardly smoke 
(iii) Smoke sometimes 
(iv) About 10 cigarettes per day 
(v) About a pack per day 
(vi) More than two packs per day 
(vii) I used to smoke, but have quit 
 
 
FQ2. What is your height and weight? 
 
 
FQ3. How is your health? Using a scale of 1 to 10—where 10 is “good” and 1 is “bad”—choose a 
number that describes your present situation. 
(Good)                                         (Bad) 
10    9    8    7    6    5    4    3    2    1 
 
 
FQ4. To which level does your dentition status belong? 
(i) All permanent teeth (including treated teeth)  
(ii) Some missing teeth, but replaced by dental implant or partial denture 
(iii) More than one missing tooth, without any dental treatment 
(iv) Wearing a full set of dentures 
21 
 
 
Option A Option B
(Receipt today) (Receipt in a year)
JPY 1,000,000 (USD 12,330.76) JPY 1,000,000 (USD 12,330.76)
JPY 1,000,000 (USD 12,330.76) JPY 1,001,000 (USD 12,343.09)
JPY 1,000,000 (USD 12,330.76) JPY 1,005,000 (USD 12,392.41)
JPY 1,000,000 (USD 12,330.76) JPY 1,010,000 (USD 12,454.07)
JPY 1,000,000 (USD 12,330.76) JPY 1,020,000 (USD 12,577.38)
JPY 1,000,000 (USD 12,330.76) JPY 1,060,000 (USD 13,070.61)
JPY 1,000,000 (USD 12,330.76) JPY 1,100,000 (USD 13,563.84)
JPY 1,000,000 (USD 12,330.76) JPY 1,300,000 (USD 16,029.99)
JPY 1,000,000 (USD 12,330.76) JPY 1,600,000 (USD 19,729.22)
Option A Option B
(Pay today) (Pay in a year)
JPY 1,000,000 (USD 12,330.76) JPY 920,000 (USD 11,344.30)
JPY 1,000,000 (USD 12,330.76) JPY 970,000 (USD 11,960.84)
JPY 1,000,000 (USD 12,330.76) JPY 1,000,000 (USD 12,330.76)
JPY 1,000,000 (USD 12,330.76) JPY 1,001,000 (USD 12,343.09)
JPY 1,000,000 (USD 12,330.76) JPY 1,005,000 (USD 12,392.41)
JPY 1,000,000 (USD 12,330.76) JPY 1,010,000 (USD 12,454.07)
JPY 1,000,000 (USD 12,330.76) JPY 1,050,000 (USD 13,947.30)
JPY 1,000,000 (USD 12,330.76) JPY 1,100,000 (USD 13,563.84)
JPY 1,000,000 (USD 12,330.76) JPY 1,300,000 (USD 16,029.99)
Note: The US dollar amounts are computed by using the average JPY/ USD exchange rate, 81.098, in October 21
to 27, 2010.
Table 3: Questions to elicit discount rates (Q5 and Q6) 
Q5. Suppose you have two options to receive some money. You may choose Option “A”, to receive
10,000,000 JPY today; or Option “B”, to receive a different amount in a year. Compare the amounts and
timing in Option “A” with Option “B” and indicate which amount you would prefer to receive for each of all 9
choices.
Q6. Suppose you have two options to pay some money. You may choose Option “A”, to pay 1,000,000 JPY
today; or Option “B”, to pay a different amount in a year. Compare the amounts and timing in Option “A”
with Option “B” and indicate which amount you would prefer to pay for each of all 9 choices.
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Table  5 (a)
The marginal effects of time discounting on health-related attributes (all samples)
Model Log pseudolikelihood #obs Controlled
*** 0.080 *** -0.061 * -806.84746 1802 -
(0.18) (0.02) (0.03)
0.721 *** 0.538 ** 0.077 *** -0.053 -758.09744 1719 -
(0.23) (0.27) (0.02) (0.03)
* 0.051 *** -0.064 ** -702.12556 1761 ○
(0.16) (0.02) (0.03)
0.426 ** 0.200 0.050 *** -0.054 * -661.11236 1680 ○
(0.22) (0.25) (0.02) (0.03)
**
-0.039 ** 0.062 -1326.3904 2281 -
(0.20) (0.02) (0.04)
-0.900 *** 0.423 -0.028 0.047 -1252.4261 2174 -
(0.26) (0.34) (0.02) (0.04)
*
-0.029 0.073 * -1280.2232 2235 ○
(0.20) (0.02) (0.04)
-0.720 *** 0.423 -0.019 0.065 -1207.7426 2130 ○
(0.26) (0.35) (0.02) (0.04)
***
-0.101 *** 0.061 -1443.9128 2281 -
(0.21) (0.02) (0.04)
-1.008 *** -0.620 * -0.104 *** 0.072 -1367.1431 2174 -
(0.29) (0.34) (0.02) (0.05)
-0.042 ** 0.061 -1192.1658 2235 ○
(0.22) (0.02) (0.05)
-0.473 -0.161 -0.047 ** 0.077 * -1134.1001 2130 ○
(0.29) (0.37) (0.02) (0.04)
*** 0.026 * 0.022 -1057.4625 2251 -
(0.16) (0.02) (0.04)
0.717 *** 0.387 0.028 * 0.011 -1003.4382 2147 -
(0.21) (0.27) (0.02) (0.04)
**
-0.004 0.029 -960.21508 2212 ○
(0.16) (0.02) (0.04)
0.463 ** 0.193 -0.001 0.014 -907.93997 2109 ○
(0.20) (0.26) (0.02) (0.04)
** 0.013 ** -0.014 -306.90501 2251 -
(0.06) (0.01) (0.01)
0.163 ** 0.053 0.014 ** -0.019 ** -290.18041 2147 -
(0.08) (0.12) (0.01) (0.01)
** 0.010 * -0.013 -289.47664 2212 ○
(0.06) (0.01) (0.01)
0.130 * 0.037 0.011 * -0.018 *** -271.87256 2109 ○
(0.07) (0.10) (0.01) (0.01)
-0.032 ** 0.019 -800.59426 2251 -
(0.18) (0.02) (0.04)
-0.110 -0.652 ** -0.032 ** 0.017 -768.81153 2147 -
(0.22) (0.27) (0.02) (0.04)
-0.005 0.014 -707.19834 2212 ○
(0.14) (0.01) (0.04)
0.097 -0.271 -0.005 0.014 -679.30904 2109 ○
(0.18) (0.22) (0.01) (0.04)
(A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
(A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
SEVERE OBESITY (A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
(A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
UNDERWEIGHT (A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
(A)
(B)
Sophisticates
Naifs
-0.429
Notes : The estimated marginal effects are listed with robust standard errors in parentheses. Control variables include: the degree of risk aversion, age, gender, the
university degree, household income, household real asset holding, household financial asset holding. *, **, *** represent statistical significances at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively.
-0.009
-0.255
0.615
0.386
(A)
(B)
Naifs
(B)
Sophisticates
0.143
0.117
-0.244
(A)
(B)
Naifs
Naifs
OBESITY
-0.335
(A)
Sophisticates
HEALTH (A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
Sophisticates
-0.704
Declining impatience（α） Impatience (ρ) Sign effect (θ)
TEETH
(A)
SMOKING (A)
(B)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
SophisticatesNaifs
0.597
0.308
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Table 5 (b)
The marginal effects of time discounting on health-related attributes (male samples)
Model Log pseudolikelihood #obs Controlled
*** 0.099 *** -0.089 -474.06317 832 -
(0.31) (0.03) (0.06)
0.995 ** 1.086 ** 0.097 *** -0.074 -440.93851 782 -
(0.40) (0.51) (0.03) (0.06)
** 0.080 *** -0.102 * -430.84857 815 ○
(0.32) (0.03) (0.05)
0.717 * 0.880 * 0.079 *** -0.086 -403.38312 767 ○
(0.41) (0.50) (0.03) (0.06)
-0.014 0.067 -681.02099 1133 -
(0.26) (0.03) (0.05)
-0.813 ** 0.582 0.003 0.043 -631.9054 1063 -
(0.34) (0.46) (0.03) (0.06)
-0.004 0.080 -653.65254 1112 ○
(0.27) (0.03) (0.05)
-0.606 * 0.618 0.011 0.066 -604.7578 1044 ○
(0.35) (0.47) (0.03) (0.06)
-0.116 *** 0.031 -734.44813 1133 -
(0.28) (0.03) (0.06)
-0.929 ** -0.314 -0.123 *** 0.043 -681.99229 1063 -
(0.38) (0.45) (0.03) (0.06)
-0.063 ** 0.031 -621.86298 1112 ○
(0.29) (0.03) (0.06)
-0.492 -0.077 -0.071 ** 0.047 -581.56499 1044 ○
(0.38) (0.46) (0.03) (0.07)
*** 0.015 -0.005 -654.6877 1127 -
(0.25) (0.02) (0.06)
0.879 *** 0.331 0.019 -0.028 -613.12904 1058 -
(0.32) (0.42) (0.02) (0.06)
**
-0.005 -0.004 -625.37227 1107 ○
(0.25) (0.02) (0.06)
0.670 ** 0.280 0.000 -0.036 -583.5051 1039 ○
(0.33) (0.42) (0.03) (0.06)
0.016 -0.021 -205.88428 1127 -
(0.11) (0.01) (0.02)
0.109 0.015 0.018 * -0.034 ** -193.36867 1058 -
(0.14) (0.22) (0.01) (0.01)
0.015 * -0.023 * -195.35226 1107 ○
(0.10) (0.01) (0.01)
0.111 0.028 0.017 ** -0.034 *** -181.94022 1039 ○
(0.13) (0.20) (0.01) (0.01)
-0.013 0.054 -206.15507 1127 -
(0.13) (0.01) (0.04)
-0.124 -0.046 -0.013 0.061 -196.8572 1058 -
(0.20) (0.14) (0.01) (0.05)
-0.005 0.049 -180.894 1107 ○
(0.09) (0.01) (0.04)
-0.009 0.033 -0.004 0.055 -170.55379 1039 ○
(0.13) (0.11) (0.01) (0.04)
Notes : The estimated marginal effects are listed with robust standard errors in parentheses. Control variables include: the degree of risk aversion, age, gender, the
university degree, household income, household real asset holding, household financial asset holding. *, **, *** represent statistical significances at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively.
-0.371
-0.259
-0.422
-0.108
(A)
(B)
-0.016
-0.146
Naifs Sophisticates
0.672
0.550
0.120
0.128
UNDERWEIGHT (A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
(A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
SEVERE OBESITY (A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
(A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
OBESITY (A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
(A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
TEETH (A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
(A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
HEALTH (A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
(A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
Declining impatience（α）
0.929
0.754
Impatience (ρ) Sign effect (θ)
SMOKING (A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
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Table 5 (c) 
The marginal effects of time discounting on health-related attributes (female samples)
Model Log pseudolikelihood #obs Controlled
0.043 ** -0.039 -282.34039 970 -
(0.20) (0.02) (0.03)
0.280 -0.076 0.041 ** -0.033 -269.72196 937 -
(0.26) (0.37) (0.02) (0.04)
0.026 -0.033 -264.28625 946 ○
(0.19) (0.02) (0.03)
0.162 -1.011 0.024 -0.029 -249.38788 913 ○
(0.23) (0.64) (0.02) (0.03)
-0.064 ** 0.055 -641.75385 1148 -
(0.31) (0.03) (0.06)
-1.034 ** 0.264 -0.059 ** 0.053 -616.57141 1111 -
(0.41) (0.52) (0.03) (0.06)
*
-0.054 * 0.059 -617.29984 1123 ○
(0.31) (0.03) (0.06)
-0.969 ** 0.132 -0.049 * 0.063 -594.0888 1086 ○
(0.42) (0.54) (0.03) (0.06)
***
-0.074 ** 0.098 -703.82783 1148 -
(0.35) (0.03) (0.06)
-1.054 ** -0.969 * -0.075 ** 0.103 -680.51742 1111 -
(0.47) (0.54) (0.03) (0.06)
-0.008 0.076 -562.013 1123 ○
(0.37) (0.03) (0.06)
-0.482 -0.299 -0.014 0.092 -545.26143 1086 ○
(0.45) (0.65) (0.03) (0.06)
0.005 0.085 -344.54865 1124 -
(0.19) (0.02) (0.06)
0.311 0.236 0.005 0.090 -334.11273 1089 -
(0.25) (0.29) (0.02) (0.06)
-0.004 0.078 -330.83656 1105 ○
(0.19) (0.02) (0.06)
0.255 0.129 -0.004 0.081 -319.81597 1070 ○
(0.24) (0.30) (0.02) (0.06)
** 0.005 -0.003 -93.731278 1124 -
(0.06) (0.01) (0.01)
0.165 ** 0.065 0.005 -0.004 -88.6025 1089 -
(0.08) (0.08) (0.01) (0.01)
** 0.004 -0.003 -91.245502 1105 ○
(0.06) (0.01) (0.01)
0.137 ** 0.054 0.004 -0.004 -86.222431 1070 ○
(0.07) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01)
-0.025 -0.039 -538.04786 1124 -
(0.34) (0.03) (0.06)
0.134 -1.239 ** -0.026 -0.052 -518.41132 1089 -
(0.42) (0.60) (0.03) (0.06)
-0.006 -0.054 -515.49627 1105 ○
(0.32) (0.03) (0.06)
0.252 -1.025 * -0.007 -0.064 -496.29253 1070 ○
(0.39) (0.57) (0.03) (0.06)
0.289
0.224
0.136
0.112
Notes : The estimated marginal effects are listed with robust standard errors in parentheses. Control variables include: the degree of risk aversion, age, gender, the
university degree, household income, household real asset holding, household financial asset holding. *, **, *** represent statistical significances at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively.
Sophisticates
UNDERWEIGHT (A)
(B)
Naifs
-0.501
-0.518
-1.054
-0.131
(A)
(B)
-0.005
Naifs
-0.437
Sophisticates
(A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
SEVERE OBESITY (A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
(A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
OBESITY (A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
(A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
TEETH (A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
(A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
HEALTH (A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
(A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
Declining impatience（α）
-0.102
Impatience (ρ) Sign effect (θ)
SMOKING (A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
0.115
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Table 6
The marginal effects of time discounting on the health-related principal component
Model R-squared #obs Controlled
All ***
-0.329 *** 0.061 0.046 1773 -
(0.69) (0.06) (0.16)
-4.137 *** -1.778 -0.320 *** 0.066 0.0485 1693 -
(0.86) (1.11) (0.06) (0.16)
***
-0.158 *** 0.111 0.2421 1739 ○
(0.65) (0.06) (0.14)
-2.694 *** -0.754 -0.155 *** 0.129 0.2404 1660 ○
(0.81) (1.07) (0.06) (0.15)
Male ***
-0.304 *** 0.030 0.0423 826 -
(0.90) (0.08) (0.21)
-4.146 *** -2.417 -0.296 *** 0.043 0.0446 777 -
(1.16) (1.47) (0.09) (0.22)
**
-0.157 * 0.125 0.2331 810 ○
(0.91) (0.08) (0.19)
-2.612 ** -1.885 -0.150 * 0.137 0.2302 762 ○
(1.23) (1.53) (0.08) (0.20)
Female **
-0.279 *** 0.131 0.0323 947 -
(0.88) (0.08) (0.21)
-3.357 *** -0.435 -0.274 *** 0.127 0.0374 916 -
(1.06) (1.23) (0.08) (0.22)
-0.151 ** 0.104 0.1584 929 ○
(0.87) (0.07) (0.20)
-2.627 *** 0.462 -0.157 ** 0.132 0.1607 898 ○
(0.99) (1.28) (0.08) (0.21)
Notes: The estimated coefficients are listed with robust standard errors in parentheses. Control variables include: the degree of risk aversion, age, gender, the university
degree, household income, household real asset holding, household financial asset holding. *, **, *** represent statistical significances at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
-1.856
-3.065
-3.188
-2.332
-2.014
-1.202(A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
(A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
(A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
(A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
(A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
Declining impatience（α） Impatience (ρ) Sign effect (θ)
HEALTHRELATED (A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
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Appendix (a)
The marginal effects on health-related attributes: Estimation with the present bias dummy (all samples)
Model Log pseudolikelihood #obs Controlled
*** 0.080 *** -0.052 -807.18862 1802 -
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
0.070 *** 0.023 0.078 *** -0.043 -702.47076 1761 -
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
0.052 *** -0.060 ** -758.87998 1719 ○
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
0.050 ** -0.001 0.051 *** -0.050 * -659.9494 1680 ○
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
*
-0.040 ** 0.055 -1326.9455 2281 -
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
-0.040 * -0.015 -0.029 0.041 -1280.3665 2235 -
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
-0.029 0.069 * -1257.9866 2174 ○
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
-0.030 -0.019 -0.020 0.061 -1211.6709 2130 ○
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
***
-0.097 *** 0.050 -1425.0716 2281 -
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
-0.156 *** -0.114 *** -0.101 *** 0.059 -1189.7081 2235 -
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05)
**
-0.042 ** 0.057 -1350.8305 2174 ○
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05)
-0.064 ** -0.037 -0.048 ** 0.073 -1132.2764 2130 ○
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
*** 0.027 * 0.032 -1057.6628 2251 -
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
0.066 *** 0.051 ** 0.029 * 0.019 -960.75763 2212 -
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
**
-0.003 0.036 -1003.3039 2147 ○
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
0.041 ** 0.034 0.000 0.019 -908.07668 2109 ○
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
0.013 ** -0.011 -309.09243 2251 -
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
0.010 -0.001 0.014 ** -0.018 * -291.37241 2212 -
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
0.010 * -0.011 -291.54504 2147 ○
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
0.010 -0.001 0.011 ** -0.017 ** -272.90882 2109 ○
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
-0.032 ** 0.015 -800.55876 2251 -
(0.01) (0.02) (0.04)
-0.033 ** 0.003 -0.033 ** 0.017 -707.13943 2212 -
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
-0.006 0.014 -768.43155 2147 ○
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04)
-0.009 0.024 -0.007 0.017 -678.38265 2109 ○
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04)
Present bias (α>0) = 1 Impatience (ρ) Sign effect (θ)
SMOKING (A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
HEALTH (A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
(A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
TEETH (A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
(A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
OBESITY (A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
(A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
SEVERE OBESITY (A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
(A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
Naifs Sophisticates
(A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
-0.020
Notes : The estimated marginal effects are listed with robust standard errors in parentheses. Control variables include: the degree of risk aversion, age, gender, the
university degree, household income, household real asset holding, household financial asset holding. *, **, *** represent statistical significances at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively.
0.056
(A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
UNDERWEIGHT (A)
(B)
0.004
-0.140
-0.054
0.060
0.027
-0.036
-0.031
0.007
0.006
0.036
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Appendix (b)
The marginal effects on health-related attributes: Estimation with the present bias dummy (male samples)
Model Log pseudolikelihood #obs Controlled
*** 0.098 *** -0.070 -475.27319 832 -
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06)
0.109 *** 0.033 0.098 *** -0.057 -432.82321 815 -
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06)
0.082 *** -0.086 -442.13036 782 ○
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05)
0.085 ** 0.003 0.082 *** -0.072 -403.97121 767 ○
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06)
-0.015 0.060 -681.65579 1133 -
(0.03) (0.02) (0.05)
-0.022 -0.010 0.001 0.038 -654.02827 1112 -
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06)
-0.005 0.075 -635.68873 1063 ○
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05)
-0.001 -0.008 0.010 0.063 -607.41528 1044 ○
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06)
***
-0.113 *** 0.025 -724.42396 1133 -
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06)
-0.164 *** -0.091 ** -0.121 *** 0.035 -619.84975 1112 -
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06)
**
-0.064 ** 0.029 -673.81662 1063 ○
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06)
-0.086 ** -0.025 -0.073 ** 0.044 -579.7625 1044 ○
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.07)
*** 0.016 0.007 -654.67041 1127 -
(0.03) (0.02) (0.06)
0.096 *** 0.043 0.019 -0.018 -626.13881 1107 -
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.06)
*
-0.002 0.006 -612.344 1058 ○
(0.03) (0.02) (0.06)
0.069 ** 0.033 0.002 -0.028 -583.52025 1039 ○
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06)
0.016 * -0.019 -206.55384 1127 -
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
0.007 -0.009 0.018 * -0.034 ** -196.20252 1107 -
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
0.016 * -0.021 -193.322 1058 ○
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
0.010 -0.007 0.018 ** -0.033 *** -181.91 1039 ○
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
-0.013 0.051 -205.99189 1127 -
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04)
-0.037 ** 0.014 -0.012 0.065 -180.90419 1107 -
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05)
-0.005 0.049 -193.21934 1058 ○
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04)
-0.020 0.018 -0.004 0.062 -167.70486 1039 ○
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05)
Present bias (α>0) = 1 Impatience (ρ) Sign effect (θ)
SMOKING (A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
HEALTH (A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
(A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
TEETH (A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
(A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
OBESITY (A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
(A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
SEVERE OBESITY (A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
(A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
UNDERWEIGHT (A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
(A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
Notes : The estimated marginal effects are listed with robust standard errors in parentheses. Control variables include: the degree of risk aversion, age, gender, the
university degree, household income, household real asset holding, household financial asset holding. *, **, *** represent statistical significances at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively.
0.081
0.047
-0.024
-0.014
(A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
-0.012
0.000
0.050
0.001
0.004
-0.137
-0.065
0.072
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Appendix (c) 
The marginal effects on health-related attributes: Estimation with the present bias dummy (female samples)
Model Log pseudolikelihood #obs Controlled
0.043 ** -0.038 -281.41183 970 -
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
0.035 0.010 0.041 ** -0.033 -264.04591 946 -
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
0.027 -0.034 -268.9623 937 ○
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
0.027 -0.001 0.026 -0.030 -250.39678 913 ○
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
*
-0.064 ** 0.051 -641.61333 1148 -
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06)
-0.056 * -0.015 -0.059 ** 0.047 -617.04976 1123 -
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06)
*
-0.054 * 0.056 -618.17789 1111 ○
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06)
-0.059 * -0.025 -0.050 * 0.055 -595.1549 1086 ○
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06)
***
-0.070 ** 0.085 -696.14385 1148 -
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06)
-0.146 *** -0.137 *** -0.070 ** 0.090 -561.72643 1123 -
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.07)
-0.009 0.073 -672.06012 1111 ○
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06)
-0.046 -0.049 -0.014 0.089 -544.72731 1086 ○
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06)
* 0.004 0.090 -343.89642 1124 -
(0.02) (0.02) (0.06)
0.026 0.045 * 0.003 0.096 -330.68714 1105 -
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.06)
-0.004 0.082 -333.06401 1089 ○
(0.02) (0.02) (0.06)
0.016 0.031 -0.004 0.086 -319.4515 1070 ○
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06)
0.005 0.001 -94.953402 1124 -
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
0.012 0.005 0.005 0.002 -92.263626 1105 -
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
0.004 0.000 -90.166184 1089 ○
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
0.010 0.004 0.004 0.001 -87.606124 1070 ○
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
-0.023 -0.040 -537.88229 1124 -
(0.02) (0.03) (0.06)
-0.029 -0.002 -0.026 -0.050 -515.34629 1105 -
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06)
-0.007 -0.054 -519.56563 1089 ○
(0.02) (0.03) (0.06)
0.003 0.030 -0.011 -0.062 -497.24566 1070 ○
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06)
Present bias (α>0) = 1 Impatience (ρ) Sign effect (θ)
SMOKING (A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
HEALTH (A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
(A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
TEETH (A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
(A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
OBESITY (A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
(A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
SEVERE OBESITY (A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
(A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
UNDERWEIGHT (A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
(A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
Notes : The estimated marginal effects are listed with robust standard errors in parentheses. Control variables include: the degree of risk aversion, age, gender, the
university degree, household income, household real asset holding, household financial asset holding. *, **, *** represent statistical significances at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively.
0.027
0.015
-0.043
-0.048
(A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
-0.017
0.014
0.022
0.010
0.009
-0.139
-0.044
0.032
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Appendix (d)
The marginal effects of time discounting on the health-related principal component (present bias dummy）
Model R-squared #obs Controlled
All *** 0.325 *** -0.022 0.049 1773 -
(0.06) (0.06) (0.16)
0.320 *** 0.216 *** 0.320 *** -0.028 0.0476 1693 -
(0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.16)
** 0.161 *** -0.084 0.2404 1739 ○
(0.05) (0.06) (0.14)
0.158 ** 0.087 0.159 *** -0.103 0.2375 1660 ○
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.15)
Male *** 0.302 *** 0.020 0.0402 826 -
(0.09) (0.09) (0.21)
0.359 *** 0.121 0.299 *** -0.003 0.0407 777 -
(0.12) (0.13) (0.09) (0.22)
0.164 ** -0.075 0.2275 810 ○
(0.08) (0.08) (0.20)
0.167 -0.015 0.160 * -0.104 0.2262 762 ○
(0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.21)
Female *** 0.268 *** -0.111 0.0468 947 -
(0.06) (0.08) (0.21)
0.283 *** 0.290 *** 0.265 *** -0.099 0.0485 916 -
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.21)
** 0.151 ** -0.094 0.1623 929 ○
(0.07) (0.07) (0.20)
0.165 ** 0.177 ** 0.157 ** -0.111 0.1611 898 ○
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.21)
0.126
0.093
0.160
Notes: The estimated coefficients are listed with robust standard errors in parentheses. Control variables include: the degree of risk aversion, age, gender, the university
degree, household income, household real asset holding, household financial asset holding. *, **, *** represent statistical significances at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
Sophisticates
Naifs Sophisticates
0.282
(A)
(B)
Naifs
(A)
(B)
(A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
(A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
0.277
(A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
Present bias (α>0) = 1
0.292
Impatience (ρ) Sign effect (θ)
HEALTHRELATED (A)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
